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CASENOTE

Uncertain Waters: Tennard v. Dretke
Provides Swells of Protection for the
Mentally Deficient But May Cause Rising
Tides of Frivolous Claims

Continuing to address the morality and constitutionality of executing
mentally deficient offenders, the United States Supreme Court in
Tennard v. Dretke1 held that the Texas jury instructions used during
The jury
the sentencing phase violated the Eighth Amendment.'
instructions were unconstitutional because they did not provide
sentencers with an adequate vehicle for assessing the defendant's
mitigating evidence of low Intelligence Quotient.3 This case has broad
implications for jury instructions in capital cases across the nation. It
also raises concerns that valid claims by deserving defendants will be
lost in a sea of frivolous claims and unidentified intelligence tests.

1.
2.
3.

124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).
Id. at 2573; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2573.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Robert Tennard, was a young male with a reported
Intelligence Quotient ("IQ") of 67, according to his Department of
Corrections record. Tennard and two accomplices broke into his
neighbors' home and murdered the couple. One accomplice killed a
victim with a hatchet, while Tennard stabbed the other victim to death.
This was not Tennard's first violent crime.4
A jury convicted Tennard of capital murder in October 1986.' During
sentencing, the jury was instructed to answer two special issues: (1) Was
the crime "committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death. . . would result;" and (2) "[was] there a probability that
the defendant . . . would commit acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing threat ... ?
The defense relied upon Tennard's low IQ

and a previous victim's testimony regarding his gullibility as mitigating
evidence. The jury answered both questions in the affirmative, and
Tennard was sentenced to death.7
Tennard attempted to raise a Penry claim,8 stating that his death
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment due to his low IQ. 9 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his claim, stating that his low IQ
alone did not establish mental retardation.10 It also stated that the low
IQ and gullibility evidence were well within the jury's reach when it
answered the "deliberateness" special issue.1 In its denial of habeas
corpus, the United States District Court of Texas agreed that a single
low score on an unidentified IQ test did not establish mental retardation,
and the IQ evidence was well known to the jury. 2

4. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2565-66 (2004). Several years earlier Tennard
was convicted of rape. The victim escaped after Tennard allowed her to go to the
bathroom. He believed her promise not to run away. The defense capitalized on this
information by using the rape victim's testimony as evidence of Tennard's gullible nature
and low intelligence. Id. at 2566.
5. Id. at 2565.
6. Id. at 2566.
7. Id.
8. "[I]t is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to
the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence
in imposing sentence." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
9. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2567.
10. Id. at 2567.
11. Id.
12. Tennard v. Johnson, Civ. Action No. H-98-4238, App. 121, 128 (S.D. Tex., July 25,
2000).

2005]

TENNARD V. DRETKE

1485

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
13
district court's denial of habeas corpus relief by applying its own test.
The court asked whether Tennard's low IQ was a "'uniquely severe
permanent handicap with which the defendant was burdened through
no fault of his own,' ' 14 and whether the crime was attributable to the
handicap. 5 The court determined that Tennard's claim failed both
parts of the test, and it denied relief.1 " In 2003 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, " vacated the judgment, and
The Fifth Circuit reinstated its prior panel
remanded the case.'
judgment denying habeas corpus relief, 19 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for the second time.2 °
II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Habeas Corpus Relief

Though lower federal courts do not have the authority to review state
court criminal convictions and sentences on direct appeal, habeas corpus
allows federal courts to review state court convictions and sentences for
errors in federal law. 2' Such an appeal is considered a collateral
attack.22 The concept of habeas corpus dates back through the centuries to England.23 Many American colonial courts allowed habeas
corpus relief prior to the Revolutionary War, and it was constitutionalized by Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution. 24 The Constitution provides that habeas corpus may only be suspended in cases of
rebellion, invasion, or when necessary to protect the safety of the general

13. Tennard v. Cockrell, 284 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 2002).
14. Id. at 595 (quoting Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1995)).
15. Id. (quotingDavis, 51 F.3d at 460-61).
16. Id. at 597.
17. This decision was made in light of Atkins v. Virginia, where the Court held that
executions of mentally retarded criminals qualified as "cruel and unusual punishments"
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
18. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2568.
19. Id. The Fifth Circuit considered whether Tennard had a valid Atkins claim. It
reinstated the prior opinion after stating that Tennard never argued his execution would
violate the Eighth Amendment. Id.
20. Id.
21. HoWARD P. FINK ET AL., FederalHabeas Corpus and State Prisoners,in FEDERAL
COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 911, 911 (1996).
22. Id.

23. Id.
24. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2.
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public.2 5 This part of the Constitution, in conjunction with 2728 U.S.C.
§ 224 1,26 gives federal courts the authority to grant the writ.
Through the years, habeas corpus has been expanded and restricted
by numerous cases and courts.28 Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy are known for voting against narrowing habeas corpus, while Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas strongly favor further
reductions. 29 At times, heated and profound disagreements have arisen
between the two groups.3 °
The statutory authorization of habeas corpus can be divided into three
prerequisites: (1) The applicant must "be in state custody;" (2) the
applicant must have "exhausted [all] presently available state remedies;"
and (3) the applicant must not "[repeat] claims in successive petitions.""' Claims are mainly granted for state violations of federal
constitutional provisions.32 To be relieved from a judgment of guilt, the
applicant must prove the existence of a "fundamental defect, which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice."33
B.

The Eighth Amendment and Common Law Protections

Habeas Corpus claims can be brought for violations of the Eighth
Amendment,34 which, in part, mandates that punishment be proportional to the crime committed.35 Cruel and unusual punishments are
expressly prohibited.3 6 To determine whether punishment is cruel and
unusual, the court determines whether such punishment was prohibited
when the Bill of Rights was adopted or whether modern social standards
require such prohibitions.37 According to Trop v. Dulles,3" the Eighth
Amendment is based on "evolving standards of decency" and the "dignity
of man."39

25.
26.
27.
28.
Brown
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; FINK, supra note 21, at 911.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1966).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2241; FINK, supra note 21, at 911, 915.
FINK, supra note 21, at 912-13. See also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915);
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
FINK, supra note 21, at 913.
Id.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 917.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Id.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
Id. at 330-31.

38. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
39. Id. at 100-01.
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At common law idiots and lunatics were exempt from criminal
prosecution and punishment.40 Idiocy was understood to mean a defect
manifested since birth, which impaired the sufferer's ability to reason,
understand, and distinguish between good and evil.41 This common law
exemption became the modern insanity defense.42 Subsequent cases
have questioned whether the mentally retarded, in general, should be
exempt from capital punishment given the common law exception for the
severely impaired.4 3
C.

The Modern Trend

Penry v. Lynaugh44 was one of the first cases to address whether the
modern consensus demands relief for prisoners suffering from mental
retardation. The case involved the rape and murder of a woman in her
Texas home. Evidence led police to Johnny Penry.45 At the sentencing
hearing, a clinical psychologist testified that Penry was mentally
retarded. His IQ ranged between fifty and fifty-three, and he was
diagnosed with organic brain damage due to trauma during childbirth.
Penry's mental age was that of a six year-old, and his social maturity
was that of a nine or ten year-old. The jury, nonetheless, found Penry
competent to stand trial. During the trial numerous psychiatrists
testified regarding Penry's insanity defense.46 The jury rejected Penry's
insanity defense and convicted him of capital murder.47 He was

40. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.
41. Id. at 331-32.
42. Id. at 332.
43. Id. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
44. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
45. On October 25, 1979, a woman was raped, beaten, and fatally stabbed with a pair
of scissors in her own Texas home. Before her death the victim was able to provide police
with a description of her assailant. This description led authorities to defendant Penry,
a twenty-two year-old man with a history of brain damage and childhood abuse. He was
arrested and charged with capital murder. Id. at 309.
46. Id. at 308-11. During the trial, Penry raised an insanity defense and provided more
expert testimony regarding his mental deficiency, but to no avail. A psychiatrist testified
that Penry suffered mild retardation and an inability to distinguish right from wrong. His
family members' testimony established severe learning problems and a childhood full of
violent abuse at the hands of his mother. The state presented two psychiatrists of its own.
Both acknowledged that Penry suffered from serious cognitive deficiencies, but they stated
that Penry understood right from wrong. They testified that Penry was legally sane at the
time of the murder, though he was unable to learn from past mistakes. Id.
47. Id. During the sentencing phase, the jury was instructed to answer three special
issues: (1) whether the conduct was deliberate; (2) whether defendant posed a future threat
to society; and (3) whether his action was a reasonable response to provocation. The death
penalty would only be administered if the jury unanimously answered all three questions
in the affirmative. The jury did just that, and Penry was sentenced to death. Id.
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sentenced to death after the jury was instructed to determine: (1)
whether Penry deliberately committed murder, (2) whether Penry posed
a future danger to society, and (3) whether Penry was provoked. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 48
Penry subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition, asserting that his
capital sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the jury was
not properly instructed on how to address mitigating evidence. The
district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. 4' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two issues:
(1) whether the jury instruction regarding mitigating evidence was
consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and (2) whether the execution
of mentally retarded criminals is cruel and unusual punishment
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.5 ° The Supreme Court held that
the jury was not properly instructed on the weight of Penry's mitigating
evidence, but the execution of mentally retarded offenders did not alone
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.51
Due to common law prohibitions against the punishment of "idiots,"
the Court stated that it may be cruel and unusual to execute the
severely retarded, but Penry's mild retardation did not warrant such
protection.5 2 The Court opined that the severely retarded are already
protected by the insanity defense.53 Penry unsuccessfully argued that
there was a growing national consensus against the execution of
mentally retarded defendants.54 The Court refused to hold that no
mentally retarded offender possessed the required culpability, and the

48. Id. at 310-12.
49. Id. at 312.
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 328, 340. Though the Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of
the Texas special issue instructions, the Court stated that the special issues were to be
interpreted broadly enough to allow the sentencer to consider all relevant mitigating
evidence. The Eighth Amendment requires the death penalty to be imposed only after
assessing the offender on an individualized basis. The Court stated that the special issues
were phrased in such a way that the jury had no adequate means for finding Penry
deserved a punishment less than death. Id. at 315, 317.
52. Id. at 333.
53. Id. In Penry's case the jury found him competent to stand trial and rejected his
insanity defense, which reflects the jury's finding that Penry understood right and wrong.

Id.
54. Id. at 340. At the time of this decision, only one state banned such executions, and
the Court criticized Penry's lack of evidence regarding the behavior of juries and
prosecutors. Id. at 334.
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Court also declined to impose a mental age requirement on the execution
of retarded defendants."5
This decision sparked much disagreement within the Court. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun believed that executions of
the mentally retarded were a violation of the Eighth Amendment."6
Justice Brennan based his belief on the clinical definition of mental
retardation, 57 while Justice Stevens looked to arguments advanced by
the American Association on Mental Retardation.5 8 On the other hand,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, and Kennedy
believed that such "inquiry has no place in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence." 9 Scalia criticized the majority for supporting sentencing decisions based on emotional responses and unlimited sentencer
discretion. 0
Subsequent cases emphasized that Penry did not announce a new rule;
rather, the holding only applied in limited circumstances.6 ' Penry was
entitled to additional instructions due to the aggravating nature of
mental retardation evidence, but this did not invalidate Texas's special
3
seventeen yearissues in other situations.6 2 In Graham v. Collins,"
old Gary Graham was convicted of murdering a man outside a grocery
store after the man refused to surrender his wallet. Graham was
sentenced to death. Basing his argument on Penry, Graham appealed,
arguing that the Texas jury instructions did not allow the jury to
adequately assess his mitigating evidence of youth, family background,

55. Id. at 338-40. Penry argued that deterrence and retribution are not served by such
punishment because the mentally retarded are less culpable and capable of understanding
the consequences of their actions. Because mental retardation encompasses such a broad
range of abilities, the Court stated that it would be impossible to hold that no mentally
retarded offender meets the level of culpability and functioning associated with capital
punishment. Id. at 338. In the alternative Penry asked the Court to impose a mental age
requirement on capital punishment. The Court rejected this argument based on the
imprecision of mental age determinations and concern that such a holding could impair the
ability of mentally retarded citizens to marry or enter into contracts. Id. at 340. Judgment
was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Id. at 336-340.
56. Id. at 341, 350 (Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
57. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 359 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 474 (1993).
62. Id. at 474.
63. 506 U.S. 461 (1993).
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and positive character traits.6
The Court rejected his argument,
stating that Penry did not signal "a sea of change." 5
Unlike mitigating evidence of good character traits and youth, the
Court clarified that mitigating evidence of mental retardation is
uniquely beyond the reach of the sentencer using the Texas jury
instructions.66 The Court stated that widely applying Penry to all types
of mitigating evidence would constitute the announcement of a new rule,
which is allowed only in limited circumstances." A new rule would
have allowed convicted criminals greater latitude for habeas corpus relief
based on the defendant's ability to present any type of mitigating
evidence. The Court stated that announcing a new rule would be
inconsistent with the Penry decision to refrain from doing just that.68
Therefore, the Court held that Penry did not extend beyond mitigating
evidence of mental retardation. 9
In sharp contrast Atkins v. Virginia70 greatly broadened protections
provided in Penry by holding that the execution of mentally retarded
offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. 1 Petitioner, Daryl Renard
Atkins, was convicted of capital murder for abducting, robbing, and
killing a victim.

2

During the sentencing phase, the defense presented

a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was "mildly mentally
retarded." 3 The psychologist based his evaluation on interviews with
Atkins's acquaintances, school and court records, and a standard
intelligence test. The test indicated that Atkins had an IQ of fifty-nine,

64. Id. at 463.
65. Id. at 474.
66. Id. at 475. See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (holding that Penry did
not extend to mitigating evidence of youth because the jury was able to give full effect to
this evidence when deciding to sentence a teenager to death for a murder committed at age
nineteen).
67. Graham, 506 U.S. at 474 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
71. Id. at 321.
72. Id. at 307. Atkins and William Jones abducted a victim on August 16, 1996 in
Virginia. Armed with a semi-automatic handgun, the two accomplices robbed the victim
and drove him to an automated teller (ATM). Cameras recorded Atkins and Jones forcing
the victim to withdraw $200. Afterwards, they drove the victim to an isolated location
where one of the accomplices fatally shot the victim eight times. Jones pleaded guilty to
first-degree murder after agreeing to testify against Atkins. Each contended that the other
had shot and killed the victim. The jury believed Jones's more coherent testimony and
found Atkins guilty of capital murder. Id.
73. Id. at 308.
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far below normal.7 4 The jury settled upon the death penalty, but the
Virginia Supreme Court required a second sentencing hearing. Atkins
was sentenced to death for the second time, and the Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed.75
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and revisited
issues raised in Penry.76 The Court explained that the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishments, and the standards for determining excessiveness are "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."77 To determine the standards approved
by modern society, the Court looked to relevant legislation of the various
states.7 8 Public outrage regarding the execution of a mentally retarded
murderer in Georgia sparked the first state statute prohibiting the
9
Seventeen other states
execution of mentally retarded prisoners.7
80
Even in states allowing the execution of
enacted similar legislation.
mentally retarded criminals, the practice was rare, and an IQ score of
8
70 seemed to be the minimum allowed for the death penalty. ' The
Court also looked to various religious communities, public opinion polls,
and international practices that supported a ban on the execution of
mentally retarded criminals.82
Based on their cognitive deficiencies, the Court stated two reasons
supporting a ban on executions of the mentally retarded: (1) the accepted
justifications for capital punishment hardly apply to retarded offenders,
and (2) there is a greater risk of retarded offenders receiving the death

74. Id. at 308-09. The psychologist administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales
test (WAIS-II), the standard American instrument for determining IQ. The average score
is 100, and Atkins scored only a 59. His score was lower than one percentile, which would
qualify Atkins for Social Security disability income. Id. at 309 n.5.
75. Id. at 309-10. At the second hearing, the state presented an expert rebuttal
witness, who stated that Atkins was of normal intelligence, though no new intelligence test
was administered. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 311-12.
78. Id. at 312.
79. Id. at 313-14.
80. These states included Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas,
Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina. Id. at 314-15. Given the unpopularity
of legislation protecting people convicted of violent crimes, the Court stated that the new
trend in protective legislation was particularly compelling. Id. at 315-16.
81. Id. at 316.
82. Id. at 316-17 n.21. The Court stated that the general consensus against such
executions reflected widespread belief that mentally retarded defendants are less culpable
and may not enjoy the procedural safeguards upon which American capital jurisprudence
is based. Mental retardation impairs one's ability to process information, learn from
mistakes, control impulses, and communicate effectively. Id. at 317-318.
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penalty despite factors demanding a lesser sentence.8 3 The Court
addressed two accepted justifications for capital punishment-retribution
and deterrence.84 The Court held that neither justification was served
because cognitive deficiencies render mentally retarded defendants less
culpable and far less likely to factor possible punishment into their
decision to commit a crime.85
The same problems that make mentally retarded offenders less
6
culpable also make them more likely to receive harsher punishments.
Their difficulty communicating and processing information makes most
mentally retarded defendants poor witnesses who often appear
unremorseful. It is more difficult for such an offender to fully participate in the judicial process.87 As made clear in Penry, presenting
mitigating evidence of mental retardation may result in proving the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness. 88 Therefore, the majority
of mentally retarded defendants are especially at risk for the death
89
Based on
penalty, despite the clear presence of mitigating evidence.
these reasons, the Supreme Court held that the execution of mentally
retarded defendants qualified as "cruel and unusual punishment"
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.9"
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed
with the majority in Atkins.9 All three believed the majority's decision
92
was based on subjective evidence rather than objective investigation.
However, Rehnquist wrote separately to emphasize his disagreement
with the majority's reliance upon opinion polls, foreign jurisprudence,

83. Id. at 318-20.
84. Id. at 318-19. The Court did not address the third justification for capital
punishment: prevention of future crimes through the incapacitation of dangerous offenders.
Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 319-20. Retribution depends upon the culpability of the offender. The Court
stated that it would be inconsistent to hold the average murderer's culpability insufficient
to warrant the death penalty, while deeming the lesser culpability of a retarded criminal
sufficient for execution. Id. at 319. In addressing the second justification, the Court
declared that capital punishment is only a deterrent for premeditated murder. Id. The
Court stated that the cognitive deficiencies of mentally retarded defendants make it far
more difficult for them to be deterred by capital punishment, because they are less likely
to understand such penalties exist and control their impulses accordingly. Id. at 320.
Additionally, exempting mentally retarded defendants from capital punishment would do
nothing to impair the deterrence value for other offenders. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 320-21.
88. Id. at 321.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 321.
92. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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and various religious views. 93 First, he attacked the validity of the
opinion polls by questioning the origins, motivations, and methods of the
poll conductors.94 Second, Rehnquist stated that the Court long ago
rejected the idea that foreign practices should be used to establish the
acceptance of practices in the United States. 95 Finally, he declared that
criminal punishment is a matter for the legislature and sentencing
juries, and they should be the sole sources used to determine American
standards for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.9"
Scalia agreed and wrote separately, emphasizing Atkins's violent
tendencies.9 7 He also stated that the Court's evidence regarding the
protective legislation of eighteen states was distorted because many of
those states permitted the execution of mentally retarded defendants in
certain situations.9" Scalia also pointed out that all the protective
statutes are new and have not passed the test of time. 99 He wrote that
executions of mentally retarded defendants are far more common than
the majority believed, and this regularity indicated public agreement
that the death penalty is appropriate for such defendants." 0 Scalia
also expressed concern that the majority's decision would lead to an
influx of frivolous retardation claims by desperate offenders. 10 '
III.
A.

COURT'S RATIONALE

The Majority

Tennard sought a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") from the
Supreme Court.1 °2 There are three necessary elements of the COA
Standard: (1) The applicant must make "a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right;" (2) the applicant must demonstrate
"that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong;" and (3) the state court
judgment must have "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

93. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 322-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 323-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 338-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 342. For example, Kansas permitted the execution of all convicted offenders,
excepting only the severely mentally retarded. Id. at 342-43.
99. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 353-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2568 (2004).
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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law,
10 3
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
The Supreme Court held that Tennard met this standard.' °4 The
Court stated that the Fifth Circuit should have evaluated the district
court's analysis of the state court decision rather than apply its own
version of the Penry holding.'0 5 Instead, the Fifth Circuit uniformly
applied a two-part test to evaluate Penry claims. First, it used the
"uniquely severe" and "nexus" test to determine whether defendant's
mitigating evidence was constitutionally relevant.0 6
If the court
decided that defendant's circumstances were uniquely severe and bore
a nexus to the crime, the court next determined whether the "evidence
was within the effective reach of the jur[y]."' O7 Because the Fifth
Circuit decided that Tennard's low IQ evidence was constitutionally
irrelevant, it never addressed whether the evidence was adequately
presented to the jury according to the Eighth Amendment.0 8
The Court determined there was no precedential basis for the
screening of mitigating evidence before deciding whether the jury
instructions adhered to the Eighth Amendment.' 9 The constitutional
relevance of evidence is established by "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more probable or less
probable . . . .""0 The state cannot prohibit evidence that a "sentencer
could reasonably find[] ... warrants a sentence less than death.""'
Thus, the mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce is
virtually limitless. The Fifth Circuit test was inconsistent with these
principles because it would screen out good-character evidence, which
sentencers are required to consider."2
Good character evidence
includes a strong sense of social responsibility and active involvement in
the community. Crimes are not typically attributable to such good
characteristics, and good characteristics are not usually handicaps.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit would
erroneously consider good characteris3
tics constitutionally irrelevant."1

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2569.
2573.
2569-70.
2569.

at 2570.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).
Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2570.
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The Court stated that trivial evidence need not be admitted, but it was
not for a panel of federal appellate judges to decide whether a defendant's cognitive deficiency is "uniquely severe. ""4 The standard is
whether the evidence might establish a reason for a lesser sentence than
death." 5 The Supreme Court further clarified that cognitive deficiencies are "inherently mitigating.""' The danger of adopting the Fifth
Circuit's test would be deeming low IQ irrelevant to mitigation but
relevant to the question of future dangerousness."' The prosecutor
clearly illustrated this threat in his argument at the trial court
level."' The prosecutor argued Tennard's low IQ was irrelevant to
mitigation but relevant to future dangerousness." 9 This was a clear
violation of the presumption that cognitive deficiencies are mitigating
factors. 2 ° Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit's
test was inconsistent with precedent and with the Eighth Amendment.

2'

B.

Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that reasonable jurists would not find
the district court's decision debatable or wrong. 22 He asserted that
Texas's two special issues gave the jury ample opportunity to consider
the mitigating effect of Tennard's low IQ."' The fact that both sides
argued the significance of the IQ evidence at the trial court level
supported Rehnquist's argument. 124 According to Rehnquist, below125
average intelligence was not the same as mental retardation.
should not be given
Rehnquist's argument indicated that low intelligence
2
1
retardation.1
mental
as
weight
same
the
Justice Scalia asserted that the Court was giving sentencers far too
much discretion to say "no" to the death penalty by applying more
stringent standards for jury instructions on mitigating evidence."17 He

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 2571.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2573.
Id.
Id. at 2566.
Id. at 2573.
Id.
Id. at 2575 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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stated that "unchanneled sentencer discretion has no basis in the
Constitution."12 Scalia clarified that increased discretion to withhold
the death sentence is inconsistent with prior decisions "requiring
canalized discretion to say yes." 29 He asserted that the Fifth Circuit's
test is entirely consistent with prior decisions to limit Penry."o
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in stating that the Court's
decision to increase sentencers' discretion to withhold the death penalty
had no basis in the Constitution. 131 He stated that the majority's
decision did not warrant stare decisis, because the Court had "long left
the Constitution behind ....
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The implications for future defendants are more noteworthy than
those for Tennard, which are limited at best. Tennard was granted a
Certificate of Appealability ("COA"), but he is far from receiving a new
trial. A court's decision to grant a COA only shows that a constitutional
right may have been denied and reasonable jurists may find the claim
debatable. The COA gives Tennard the opportunity to appeal the denial
of federal habeas corpus relief. It does not grant Tennard his freedom.
For subsequent cases the Supreme Court requires trial courts to allow
evidence of any capital defendant's cognitive deficiencies. This will affect
state death penalty instructions generally. Allowing the sentencer some
consideration of this type of evidence is not sufficient to ensure the
punishment fits the crime. In order to prevent cruel and unusual
punishment, the sentencer must be allowed full consideration of such
mitigating evidence. Not only would such punishment violate the Eighth
Amendment, but it would also mark the deterioration of our justice
system. It is important to maintain a system where the punishment
suits the crime. Information regarding impaired intellectual functioning
is relevant to mitigation in the punishment phase of the trial, though it
is not relevant to the question of guilt. Therefore, juries must fully
understand that they have the power to deny the death penalty based
on mitigating evidence alone.
The danger of this decision is that unidentified intelligence tests may
be used as mitigating evidence. Tennard's IQ evidence is based on a test

128. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). These cases included Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461
(1993), and Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
131. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2576 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas's comment refers to the dissenting opinions
in Penry, concerning Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 351.
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administered by the prison system during a prior incarceration.1 3 3 On
cross-examination Tennard's parole officer testified that he did not know
who administered the intelligence test. The reliability of this test is not
discussed at length. The Court does not address who administered the
test, what the conductor's qualifications were, or how the test was
conducted. The Court stated only that evidence of low IQ was "inherently mitigating." 13 4 This decision may lead to an influx of unidentified
tests, frivolous claims, and the sacrifice of judicial economy. At the
moment, criminals have nothing to lose by claiming a low IQ. The
prospect of a lighter sentence is an incentive to do so. Meanwhile, courts
may be faced with evaluating the validity of an ever-growing number of
IQ tests. Such results could not only lead to lesser sentences for
undeserving defendants, but they could also impair credible evidence
presented by deserving defendants. Neither outcome is desirable.
Another problem is deciding where to draw the line between criminals
who are simply of below average intelligence and criminals who deserve
lesser sentences due to their deficiencies. On the one hand, a below
average intelligence may be why many criminals are apprehended in the
first place. Lightening sentences for such offenders may shock the
general public. Few district attorneys would want to tell a victim's
family that an IQ score could lead to a lesser sentence for the offender.
On the other hand, there certainly are cases where the offender's IQ
is low enough to render the justifications for capital punishment
questionable. Offenders with lower IQs may not be able to fully
comprehend the implications of capital punishment, thereby rendering
deterrence and retribution ineffective. The moral implications of
executing an offender whose IQ borders on mental retardation are
important to consider. Some offenders may have an IQ that renders
them incapable of understanding capital punishment, but still ineligible
for the protections afforded mentally retarded offenders. The difficulty
is determining what IQ range deserves lighter sentences because
different intelligence tests produce different results, and IQ has been
known to change with age. Given these problems the Court may need
to set specific standards for IQ tests and set IQ requirements that differ
according to the age of the offender. This opens the door to even more
questions about what testing procedures are best and what effect age
has on IQ.
It may also be necessary for the Court to reconcile this decision with
prior cases that have sought to limit Penry.135 Unlike the present case,

133. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (2004).
134. Id. at 2571.
135. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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previous cases have refused to extend Penry beyond mitigating evidence
of mental retardation." 6 In fact those cases stated that doing so would
constitute the improper announcement of a new rule. 3 7 The present
case's extension of Penry to mitigating evidence of low IQ is in sharp
contrast with cases where the Supreme Court has upheld only a limited
view of Penry. As stated in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, "'[tihe
simultaneous pursuit of contradictory objectives necessarily produces
confusion.'""'
KRISTIN L. STARNES
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